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The Main focus of this C2 paper is the discussion of how a small State with limited military capabilities can 
regain the initiative from an attacking regional military power with superior resources. The theoretical 
starting point is based on modern military theory that describes the new generation of warfare as well as a 
discussion on readmission on initiatives relating to operational management based on C2 research at the 
National Defence University in Stockholm. The work ends with a discussion on essential areas of knowledge 
management and scientific approaches in the ongoing management of C2 research. 
Initially the contemporary theory of the new-generation warfare with particular interest in strategic 
objectives, capabilities and vulnerabilities is described. Russian emphasis on the initial phase of operations 
as a precondition for operating success, choice of control efforts and prioritization of strategic targets are 
shown special attention. In modern military theory the changing quality in military objectives, means and 
methods is of high importance. The current operational means are supported by new technologies and 
applied sciences. In military affairs could the use of new knowledge and practical experiences give decisive 
advantages against an opponent who lacks these capabilities.
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Offensive operations, “maskirovka” (deception) and surprise have always been important in Russian military 
thinking. Operational art includes objectives, actions, resources, as well as calculated risks. Operational 
planning uses elements of operational design to show the operation's implementation that has been carried 
out in advance. In short, the adversary has the initiative and will make every effort to maintain it, but how 
can the smaller nation defend and take back the initiative against an opponent that conducts parallel warfare 
on strategic vulnerabilities? What options at the operational level are possible and necessary if to create 
robust and redundant methods and processes in order to take back the initiative? 
The offensive superior adversary assume to reach decisive operational conditions within the first 24 hours 
(the operation will take a few weeks to complete but the essential operational outcome will evolve within the 
first 24 hours) and the superior adversary will direct its resources towards prioritized strategic objectives. 
The opponent will use all available resources at all commands levels, military as well as civilian. Lines of 
operations will be massive in space and time: space-and air forces, naval forces, strategic strike aviation and 
transport aviation, missile forces, Special Forces and intelligence units. Civil advocacy agents and Special 
Forces are expected to act in the depths of the operational environment.
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Targeting depends on the strategic end state, what simply must be achieved within the military operation. 
The end state could be a positive behaviour toward the superior adversary, and of most importance a 
comprehensive support for the adversary national interests. Strategic objectives can be immediate 
neutralization of both vital military infrastructure and vital civilian infrastructure. The purpose of this is to 
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demonstrate to national and regional political and military leadership that the nation initially has been 
deprived of its most important capabilities to protect, manage and maintain stability in the country. 
The superior opponent's aggressive ambitions and military readiness affects the smaller nation by its surprise, 
concentration on forces, and his ability to predict the effectiveness the strategic synergies in selected 
directions. The political leadership is the primary target, can be confronted directly and indirectly. Indirect 
action is aimed against the population to change their behaviour in a wishful way by the degradation of the 
society's vital societal functions such as power supply, water and sanitation, health care, communications and 
transports. 
Vital military targets are not difficult to predict. Important command posts, air and naval bases, logistics 
centres, sensors in the air, at sea and on land would be effected. Even civilian command posts at national and 
regional level can be neutralized. The opponent will destroy as little infrastructure as possible, but may use 
restricted weapons based on new scientific principles as: acoustic, electromagnetic, chemical, biological, 
genetic, laser and radiation weapons. These weapons are considered to provide positive psychological effects 
even at minimal use. This special use of these weapons needs a thorough risk assessment at all levels.
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All the effects above affect all command levels to a certain degree. Since one of our conclusions above is 
that the strategic level will be targeted early in a conflict, the C2 methods of lower levels requires special 
attention in order to handle the conflict. In the discussion below, we have therefore focused on the operative 
level, but many of the proposals are probably valid also for the tactical level. 
One of the dominant research issues in C2 to handle a large variety in the opponent’s tools deals with the 
concept of agility [ref1], which is seen as the capability to adapt the C2 approach according to the 
circumstances. This means according to the authors, e.g., those simple, decomposable problems can be 
handled with a centralized C2 approach; while a complex situation requires a de-centralized approach they 
call edge C2. The idea is that edge C2 enables the entities in the mission to quickly react to changes in local 
circumstances without having understood the whole global picture, while a more centralized approach is 
slower to react in this case. A mature C2 system is capable to vary the C2 approach between these two 
extremes according to what is required by the situation. 
The idea that C2 needs to be faster than today due to a rapidly changing environment is valid also for the 
case outlined previously in this paper with a small state facing a superior opponent, but in this case the 
changing environment can be caused by e.g. information warfare, comprehensive warfare with civilian 
actors, and the use of Special Forces. However, the conclusions drawn in
4
 [ref1] and the following works of 
the NATO SAS working groups in this field are based on the assumption that the endeavour includes large 
enough resources to solve the situation at hand. For a small country facing a strong adversary this will not be 
the case, and therefore C2 agility needs to be complemented by other methods to be able to react to rapidly 
changing circumstances and to be able to surprise the opponent. In this work, we propose a conscious 
variation in the use of methods in the C2 process as a way to better handle rapidly changing circumstances 
and to be able to take the initiative even when facing a superior opponent. These methods also put a high 
demand on adaptive data collection. 
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In order to design a C2 system (organization, methods, mandate, technology, personnel,), it is necessary to 
know how C2 is affected by variations in the design in different circumstances. In this work, we discuss the 
consequences of varying the properties of a limited number of C2 methods used in COPD and under what 
circumstances they should be varied. We argue that it may be beneficial to: 
 
 Vary the time horizon of the plans. A long time horizon is beneficial when the whole mission is 
considered, but a shorter time horizon makes the planners more agile in terms of reacting to 
changing circumstances. 
 Vary the focus of the assessment process. The current assessment methodology (COPD) focuses on 
assessing the outcome and consequences for the plan, while in a rapidly changing environment there 
is a need to complement the focus on assessing the plan with a larger emphasis on the environment. 
 The command concept needs to be adaptable to allow for collaboration with civilian authorities. This 
includes the capability to react to information warfare. In this case also legislative issues also need to 
be addressed. 
 The operative level needs to be able to operate during the whole operation without input from the 
strategic level since we can assume that the strategic level will be an early target in an attack. 
Likewise, the operative level very early needs to give the tactical level directions so they can work 
independently for a long time period. This requires new capabilities of both quick planning and of 
assessing the situation at a high (≤ strategic) level. 
 
Conclusions 
In the new generation of warfare is the main strategic objective the political and military leadership. The 
methods to neutralize or the impact on these targets are a mix of mainly asymmetric and indirect methods. 
High tech communication technologies, long range precision weapons and weapons based on new physical 
principles. To achieve initiative the adversary will attack strategic vulnerabilities civilian as well as military 
targets.  This kind of strategic attack will initially paralyze the nation and the military because the control 
functions of the state will be mainly or partly neutralized, and some of them eventually wiped out.  
These effects put high demands on the command levels below the strategic level, and in this paper we 
discuss how the C2 methods of the operative level can be adapted to handle the rapidly varying environment 
under these circumstances. In the scenario of a small state facing a superior opponent using the new 
generation warfare, the current focus of research on C2 agility for large endeavours needs to be 
complemented with research on how different methods used in the C2 process can be varied in order to 
better meet the requirements of varying circumstances in the environment. We propose that further research 
is made in this area to better understand how C2 methods can be efficiently adapted to the needs of smaller 
states. 
  
 
